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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
GooDYEAR TmE AND RUBBER CoMPANY, a eorporation, and HARTFORD AcciDENT AND INDEMNITY
CoMPANY, a .corp-oration,

Plaintiffs,
Case No. H2:50

YS.

THE INDUSTRIAL C'oMMISSION oF
THE STATE OF UTAH and LEE
JAMES HARRIS,

Defendarn.ts.

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF

Two ·questions .are herewith presented for review.
First, was the applicant, Lee James Harris, injured by
an accident which .arose out 10f or in the course of his employment 1 Second, may the Co.mmission award compensation .covering permanent los~s of bodily function
witho~t evidence of permanent injury1 The first question
more narrowly stated is simply this: Is an employee en·
titled to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation
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.A!ct under the .following .circumstances, to-wit: when he
leaves the premis-e1s of his employ·er, g1oes to his home for
his dinner, .and, incidentally, to give his sister a ride on
a motor.cycle, and is injured o·n. the public highway while
returning to his employer's pla~ce o.f busine~ss ~
In considering the following statement of facts, upon
which there is no dispute, two questions must he kept in
mind. First, at the time of the accident, what duty was
Harris performing that benefited or furthered the interests of his employers~ Second, at the tlime of the
accident, who had ·Control of his activities~
It is earnestly believed that this ~c·ourt will not sustain this decision of the Industrial !Commission, which
has departed from .a fundamental a·nd well-settled Tule
of law which, simply stated, is this: That when an employee goes on a. personal errand of his own, to-wit: to
get a meal at his home, he departs from his employment
and is IliO't covered.
The material facts which are undisputed are briefly
these: Harri·s was a part-time employee, having been
employed only five days. On the day in question, May 8,
19·39, near the close of the day's work, a. rush job had
come in and he was instructed to remove the wheels from
this truck while his foreman, Ed 'Sehneider, and another
employee went after the ·new wheels. After the foreman
had left, Harris helped himself to a motorcycle belonging
to plaintiff, Goodyear Tire ,& Rubber Company, .and left
the premisHs, ais he says, to get his supper, but as was
also proven, to give his· ·sister a ride. A few n1inutes
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later, 'Yhile returning· to V\ ork, he Lost eontroLof the same
and he c.rashed into a. house, injuring himself.
7

The theory of 'vorkmen 's compensation is itself a
departure from the ·Common law rule, which did not require one to pay £or another',s injury unle·ss· caused by
fault. The cases limit this payment of eompensation
without fault to a.ecidents whi~h· arise out of or happen
in the course of the employment. Manifestly, the decision
of the Industrial .c~ommission requiring the employer to
compensate the employee for an aecident which happened
away from the employer's premises, wholly di·s-connected
from his business and at a time when the employer [had
no control and direction over the empltoyee, is contrary
to law. The de-cision o.f the .Q'ommission herein is directly
opposed to a \Yell-settled rule of law of this state.
THE

F'ACT~S

IN THE· CAS·E.

A's applied t'o the first question, it conclusively appears that Ed .Schneider was the foreman in charge of
the station of the Goodyear Tire & R.ubber c~ompany,
and that the applicant understood such was the case is
apparent from his testimony in the transcript page 11.
Again at transcript page 7 a~ppea.rs the following testimony ·Of the applicant: ''Ed ·Schneider wa·s in .charge .of
the Service department ~here I was working,'' and ''he
had never give·n me any instructions about using the
motorcycle at any time.''
1

,Ed Schneider testified that he was the assistant
service manager and tihat Harris was working under his
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direction. (·Tr. 14) He further testified, "My instructions were, when I left to get the wheel s, that Mr. Sims
and Mr. Ericks·on were to get lunch and while I was gone,
he (Harris) was to take the wheels ,off the truck and
after I .got. back and the other boys got hack, we would
let him (Harris) go. I told him wihen I got ha·ck and
the ·other boys got back, he and I would go.'' (Tr. 3'5)
I told him to stay there until I got back ( Tr. 36) ''and
against instructions, he left the premises.'' (Tr. 39) He
ha·d been directed to take off the inside nuts, but ''he
left before that was finished.'' ('Tr. 40)
1

At page 15 of the transcript appears
testimony by the applicant:

~he

following

Q. Mr. Schneider was the one who employed you?
A. Y·es. ·
Q. He didn't say you could take the m>o·torcycle to
go home or go to supper~
A. No, he didn't.
There is nothing in the record that even intimates
that the employer ·sent Harris home for his supp·er. On
tihe ·contrary, the evidence ~shows that he v1olated the instructions given to him by .assistant manager .Schneider,
who was in..charge of the work, to remain at work taking
off the wheels, until ~1e. could return with new ones, and
then both of them would g;o· to supper. It was a rush
job and H~rris was so informed by Mr. Schneider, and
yet he left without ·completing t:he "\vork laid out for him
and vv.hich he \·\,.as directed to do pri~o·r to Mr. Schneider's
return.
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There is not a particle of evidence in the record tha.t
the employer or anyone in authority in its behalf gave
the applicant permission to take the motorcycle home
with him, (immaterial as it is to the issues in this case)
-or that the applicant, while away from the· p:remi~s-es
getting his supper, was doing anything whatsoever in the
coul"se •of his employment or of use or b€nefit to his
e-mployer's business.
Sneh being the evid.ence, what basis, then, is there
for a finding by the Commission that the applicant, at
the time -of the accident, was within the scope of his employment~·
Certainly fuere is no comp·etent 'or sub. .
sta.ntial evidenice in the record to support any !Such
finding.
As to the ·second question, raised herein, to-wit:
''May the ~c·ommission award compensation covering
per.manent loss of bodily function without evidence of
permanent injury~" it should suffice to s.ay at this point
in the brief, under a discussion ·of the facts, that there is
not a. scintilla of .evidence in the record on this point.
The law applica;hle to the same will be discussed later on
in the brief under subdivision II.
T~HE

D,E·C'lSION OF ·THE C10·MMLS.SI~ON IS
CON'TRARY TO LAW.
. ·'· '·

I. The evidenee here shows without contradiction
that the injury did not arise out •Of or in' the course of
applicant's employment, and there iS' no evidence to support any 'such finding tha.t it did. It is a fundamental
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
and well-recognized rule of law in this jurisdiction as
WBll as elsewhere that an employee injured on the way
to and from meals is not entitled to ecompensation,. for
he is serving primarily a purpose of his ·Own.

II. ·There is no competent or substantial evidence
in the r.e·cord, and, in fact, no evidence, to support the
finding of the Oommi,ssion that the applicant ''while in
the course of his duties as helper, sustained accidental
injury,'' and that he now suffers some permanent partial
loss of the use of his left leg below the knee as a result
of such injury; but, on the contrary, ~such findings are
predicated solely upon surmise, speculation, .and oonjecture.
Therefore it is apparent that the 'Commission's eonelusions of law herein are contrary to law, and are
unsupported by any finding of fact based up·on competent
or su!b.stantial ·eviden·ce, and therefore the decision i~s
contrary to law in its entirety.

I.
THE INJURY DID NOT ARISE OUT OF OR liN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.

T:he decision of the Commission herein is contrary
to the rule laid down by this eourt in the case of Fidelity
and Casualty Compan1y v. Commission, 79 Utah 189, 8
P. (2d) 617, wherein this question was pre,sented to it
and the award therein made hy the Industrial C·ommission was annulled and set aside.

The rule announced
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by this court in that case is in full accord 'vith the estabTished authorities e1se~·e(re. Undoubtedly . tthe error
made herein is .accounted for because of the pressure of
work upon the Commission, and had reference been made
to the decisions of this Court, and if all the memher·s of
the Commission had had an opportunity to pass on same,
the result arrived at vvould have been. exactly opp,nsite.·

The facts in this ·case, as h·ereinhefor.e pointed out,
demonstrate that the employee was not -acting in the
course of his ·employment when injured, so that the decision of th.e ·C'ommi,ssi~on, if sustained, would have the
effect of extending the liability of employers not only in
compensation, but also in personal injury eases involving
third .parties, to situations where the ·empl,oy-ee was not
acting in the course of his employment.
It is evident that a decision that an employee is entitled t.o Workmen ',s ·Compensation Insurance· when injured at a time when he is not under th.e contr,nl or right
of ·Control of his employer, nor in any way limited in his
activities by reason of his .employment, in facst, holds
that it is not necessary t:hat the employee shall have been
acting in the .course ,of his employment, to be entitled to
Workmen's Compensation for injury.
'The decision of the Industrial Commission 1n this
case fails to recognize that .an employee is not acting in
the course of his emp1oy:rne·nt vYhen he is going to his
plac-e of ·employment or coming back therefrom. The
''going and coming" rule is well established, not only
in thi's state, but .el.seWihere, .and the evidence in this case
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demonstrates -that the rule is fully appli~cable to the case
at bar. To reverse such a well-established rule would
be to~ unsettle the law and add s·erious burdens to industry not contemplated by the L1egisl.ature and unwarranted in justice and ·principle.

4

While in the ·CasH of Ocean. Accident arnd Guaramty
Company v. Industrial Accider~At Commission, 173 ·Cal.
313, it is recognized that it is a. nHce,ss.ary part of his
employment that the employe~ shall go to and return
from his place of labor, the Court said:
'''Therefore, an ·employee going to and from
his place of employment is not r.endering any
·service and hegins to render such service only
when, as has been ·said, arriving at the place of
his emp1oyment he pr•O'Ceeds to use some instrumentality provided, by means of which he equally
places himself in a. position to perform his tasks.''
This rule wa·s later affirmed hy ·0 hief Ju,stice Waste
in the later case of California Casualty lnd.emnity Exoha.nge v. Industr~a1l Accident Comm,ission, 190 Cal. 433.
1

This ·court in the case of N or.th Poifn,t c:onsol. I rr. Co.
v. Industrial Commissi.on ·Of Utah, et .a,Z., 61 Utah 421, 214
P. 22., held that an employee was not protec~ted while on
his way to work even though he had been disapp~ointed
in receiving transp•OTtation promi,sed by his forem:an
without authority. T'he following is taken from the
syllabus in that case.
''Injuries to an ·employee .struck by an automobile while riding his bicycle on a street of his
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own selection on his way to 'vDrk, after his foreman failed to get a.n automobile to carry him, as
he had stated he might do, did not arise in the
course or out of the employment within th·e Workmen '!s Compensation Act, the foreman having
undertaken to provide transportation as a. mere
accommodation with~out .authority from the emp1oyer, who was not obligated to do so.
''''Where a.t the tim·e of the injury the employee is engaged in a voluntary act not accepted
by, or kn~own to, his employer and outside of the
duties for which he is employed, the injury cannot
be said to be in the ·Course of the employment.''
71 C·. J. 663.

This fundamental principle is sustained by .authorities in practically every sta.te in the United States, inc1uding the recent Utah ease of Ric"4 v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 511, 15 P. (2d) 641.
The following principle, well sustained by authority,
is found in 71 C. J ., page 638:
''Nevertheless a de:fi.ni tion widely adopted is
that an injury to an employee arises in the course
of hi~s· employment when it occurs within the peri~od
of his employment, at a. :pla.ee where he may reasonably be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling
the duties of his employment or engaged in doing
something incidental to it.''
An .attempted extension of the doctrine to protect
an employee while on his way to or f:vom work was very
vigorously made in the leading ·case of Postal Telegraph
& Cable Co. v. lrr1Adustria.Z Accident Co.1nmission, 37 P.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
(2d) Page 442. ;This ·Court will recognize the importance
of that ease, .and very seld()m indeed are so many
eminent counsel called into a. legal controversy as there
were in tha.t case. The reason therefore is because of
the seriousness of the que·stion a:nd the attempt to bring
under the coverage of the Workmen's C~ompensation
.&ct, .accidents not arising in the -course of the employment. 'The facts in that case al,so involved a moto-rcycle ·opera ted by an _em·ployee. The injured man was on
no special errand for the employer and had not yet
reached his place of employment where his duties ibegan.
The facts are identical in that regard with the -case under
consideration. !Said the ·C:ourt:
'·'When an employee is off duty, the relation
of employer and employee is susp:ended and does
not reattach until the employee resumes the master's wo,rk. ''
The Court further said:
''He could not only deviate for the conveniof his friend, but could also perform any ta,sk
for himself or for another at any time before
reaching the .pla:ce where his duties were to begin.
This hoiding is in accord with the overwhelming
weight of a.uthori ty wihere the principle involved
is identical with that found in the instant case."
~enc.e

The award was annulled.
In the case of Covey-Ba.Zlard Motor Co., et a.Z., v.
lndustri.al Com.mission, et al., 64 Utah 1, 227 Pac. 1028,
involving a salesman wJl,ile riding home in his own auto-
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.m,ohile after attending- a meeting at the office of th~e
employer, it \Yas held that injury was n·ot comp·ensable
as arising in the- course of the employment.

In the case of Denver & Rio Gratnde R. R. Co. v·.
Indu.str1:az Commission., et al., 72 Utah 19~9, '269 Pac. 513,
the company furnished transportation from the section
house, but the accident happened before the employee got
to the section house and in the sam·e ve'hi.cle driven by the
s.ame employ~ee that was later to take him fr·om the section house to the place of work. The court, after reviewing the authoritie.s, held that the risk of going to the
~section house was the employe~e 's and, there:Bore, tihe
award .of the Utah Industrial Commission was annulled.
Announeing the pri·nci ple, this court said:
''Before .arrival at the section house in the
morning neithe-r (employee nor truck driver) were
under_ the icon trol or direction of the empl·nyer. ''
In the case of Greer v. Industrial Commission., et al.,
74 Utah 379, 279 Pac. 900, an employee carrying a saw
which he had sharpened at home was injured, but the
.court held that he was not protected while on his way
to work merely hecaus!e he wa~s carrying a saw belonging to the company and which it was his duty to keep
·sharp, as this was only incidental and the employ~ee did
nnt come within any of the excepti·ons to the general rule.
Thi~s C~ourt

said :

''In this case the deceased was not injured
while ~sharpening the saw at .his home. The accident did not occur while he was actually engaged
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in the performance of a duty for the employer.
·The dangers of the street between his home and
thje stoickyards were not incidental to his employment, but were dangers common to all.''
:Surely.by this te.st the applicant's case herein falls,
beeause h·e ~as not performing any duty for his empLoyer. It thus appears that the decided Utah cases are
in full agreement with the general. rule .and are decisive
of the issue here in f.avor of .plaintiffs .and against the
decision and award of the ·Commission.
The fa:ct.s in the case ·of Fidelity a:nd Casua·lty Compa;ny v. Industria.[ Commission (supra), in which this
Court reversed an award of compensation made hy t'he
Industrial ·C•ommission made out .a much stronger claim
for compensation than do the facts herein. Ther·e the
employ.ee was required to have and use a bicycle and was
required to take a bicycle hom·e after working hours
ibecause his first duty in the morning was to go directly
from home to the Semloh Hotel where he picked up films
for development .and which he was required to take to hi·s
place of empioyment. This hotel was on his dir.ect r•oute
to his place of employment. While riding his bicycle
from home to the hotel, and before reaching the hotel,
he was injured. This Court held that ;his. 0o-urse of employment did not -com-mence until he arrived at his place
1

of employment, and that not having reached the ·Bem1oh
Hotel, where his duties first began, (he had not yet en·,tered upon his duties for his employer and was not,
therefore, acti_ng in the eourse of his employment. This
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Court pointed out in that case, that .at the time the
employee 'vas injured he was in no sense under the
control of his employer, indicating that in ord·er for the
relationship of an empl,oyer ;and employee to exist there
must he control or the right of control, and that Without
this there is no employm~ent and neees,sarily no course
of empl•oyment.
The Court s.aid :
''It is a general rule of law that an injury
sus:tained by an empl10yee while ·going to oT returning from his place of work upon his own initiative
in a. conv;eyance of his own choosing and on his
own time is not an injury arising out oif .or in the
·course of 'his employment and heruc.e an injury
thus sustained is not eompensahle under W·orkmen 's CompenS"ati•on Acts. This court is committed l·o such doc:trifn.e.'' (Italies ours.)

"North Point Consol. lrr. Co. v-. Industrial
Con'IJm(ission, 61 Utah 421, '214 P. 2·2·;
Greer v. Industrial Com.rntission,
74 Utah 379, 2.79· P. 900 ;
De~Y~;ver

&; Rio Grande W. R. Co. v. Indus-

trial Comm., 72. Utah 199, 269 P. 512,
62 A. L. R. 143-6;
Covey-Ballard Mo·tor C·o. v. Industrial Commission, 64 Uta~h 1, 227 P~ ·1028."
In this cas,e, just as in ·the ease above referred to,
the employee was at peTfect liberty to take wha~tev.er
·course he desired to reach his .pla!ce·. of employm~ent and
a~s the C•orurt said, ''the time when he was to enter upon
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hi·s- employment had not yet arrived.'' J.n that case, just
as in this ca•s-e, the employe-e was not under the protection of the act when he was se¥eral miles a.w·ay from his
plruce of employment and ·on his way to work. There is
no rea.s,on whatever for applying a different rule in the
instant eas·e than in the ease ahove referred to.
In the instant case it was wholly immaterial to the
empl·oyer where the employee should have hi·s meals and
what means of conveyancle, if !any, he should use in going
to such pla.c•e. Certainly it was not responsible £or his
use ·of the motorcycle ~or the manner in whieh he operated it. Where the employe·e went to obtain food was no
·eoncern . of his employer and the ·manner in which he
·chose to g~o there was entirely his ·own selection and not
that rof his -e-mployer.
During the time that the •employee was absent in
going 'to his (home his employment was suspended and
during such time no act of his can be .eonsidered as occurring in the course ·of his employment, either for the
purpose. of estaplishing a right ·to eompensa.tion or to
justify an action by a third party agajnst the employer
£or the a.c.t.s of ~the employee. In driving the motorcycle
h·ome he ac.ted as a free agent a?d rhis method and course
of travel w~ere in no way eontrrolled by his employer.
When inj-ured, he was on no errand for his employer and
was neither bound to render it further serviee nor was
he subje-ct to its .further directions until he returned to
the premis·e.s £nr work.

As said hefore, the relation of

the employer .and employee was suspended.

T.h~ere
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at the time of the accident, ·no employment, as
is used in the statute.

~the

term

It is uniformly held that to entitle an employe·e to
compensation for an injury he must prove that he was
performing a service for his emp·Zoyer. In going to a:nd
from his home the employee in this ca.s·e was performing
a service for himself. Th,er·e is, therefore, no basis for
taking this case out of the "going and coming" rule.
It is apparent from the testim,ony that the employee
in tihis case took the motorcycle without the peT·mission
of his ·employer, so that he might have a. means of transportartion to his own ;home to obtain ·something to eat
and to give his sister a ride. That was his own p·ersonal
business. If he .had been injured while walking to or
from his employer's premises, it is certain that he would
not then have been in the ·course of his empl,nymen t.
Does the fact that he took his empl,oyeT 's motorcycle,
without ·permissi•on, change the situation in any way~ He
was not insured generally against ·accident while working .for hi·s ·employer. At home or on tihe street he may
meet with an aec.ident not arising out .of or in the course
of his employment.

The act does not cover such cases.

The ·employee g-ets up in t:he morning, dresses hims·elf,
eats, tha:t he may he able to work, and go·es to work
bec:ause ·of his employtnent; yet, if he meet·s with an accident heiore arriving a.t the employer '.s .premises, tiha.t is
not a risk of his occupation, but of life generally. He was
not in.jured while on duty nor in his working

h~nurs
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q!l his way to or from his duty within the pTemis·es of
th:e employer.

It is manifest from the evidence that

~the

employee
took the motorcycle as a matter of eonvenience to himself
and for his own pleasure, and t~his too, without the consent of his employer. He was neither required nor
directed to go home f,o,r his supper, nor to use the employer's motorcyc.le for that purpose. On the contrary,
ihe violat·ed the instructions given him to eontinue with
his work in removing the wheels fr,om the truck and to
remain on the premises of his employer until such time
as his boss could return with new whe-els, at which time
he had been told he might then go to supper.

As- was said in the case of Johnson v. Sta.te
Oom.mission, 134 Atl. 5·64:

H'igh~v·ay

·

"·The petit~oner's accident did not arise in
~the ·course of ·or out of his ·employm·ent any more
than did .a.n accidental injury received after he
returned from his day's work, and while he was
removing his working clothes in ihis own home,
preparing him·self for his evening meal and night's
rest.''
.A .pr,op·er appli-cation of the above established prin-

ciple must necessarily lead to the <C~onclusion that the
injury in the :cas:e at ;bar did not ·occur in llie courS"e of
employment.
'There ar.e numerous ,other authorities from many
jurisdictions, ~ut enough !has heen cited from •our own
Court to c:learly define the p·rinciple upon which the
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decision here ·should be based. It is· simply· this,, as set
out in the ease of Ocean Accident & Gua,ranty ·Co. · v.
Industrial .A.acideml Commission, (supra):
'''!But it is to be noted that the right to an
·a:\vard is not founded upon the faic.t that rthe injury
grows out of and is incidental to his employment.
It is founded upon the fact that the service h,e is
rendering at the time of ~the injury grow·s out ·of
and is incidental to the employment. Therefore,
the employ:ee going to and from his place of ·employment is not rendering .any servic:e and begins
to render suC'h service only when, as has been
said, arriving at the place ·of his employment, he
proceeds to use some instrumentality provided,
by means of \Yhich he immedia,tely places himself
in a positi~on to perform his tasks. 'Such beyond
·question is the reasoning of the cases .and the
meaning of their adjudication * * *. ''
In the 'Case ·of Ha,rtford Accident.&; Indemnity C?mpany, et al., v. Lodes, (Okla.) 1933, 22 .P. ('2d) 861, i~t was
held that an ·employee engaged to haul wa~t~er for his
emp1oyer's gin and who was injured when the team ran
away while he was returning to the gin after having gone
home for dinner wa.s not entitled to :eompensation because
the injury ''did not arise •out of or in the cours:e of his
1

employment. '' The .court said at page 363 :
''T-o ·eonstitute an injury ~.rising out of ·and
in the .course of employment t!here must be existing at the tim·e of the injury the rela.tionsihip of
master and servant between employer .and employee and ~such emp1o~yee cannot bring himself
within the ~provisions of the Workm·en's ·C~om
pensation LaV\r for an accidental personal injury
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sustained by him unless at ~he_ time of ~he injury
he is on some substantial m1ssron for 'h1s employer gr.owing out ,of or incidentally or specifically
connected V\rith such employment. He must be
rendering some service to his master at the time
·of the injury and he· there by pl_a.ces himself in a
pa:sition whereby he a.s·sumes h1s task under the
relationship of master and servant. See Oldham
v. ,southwestern Surety Ins. Co., 1 Calif. Industrial ~ccident Commission De~cisi~ons (No. 171914)
7; Oeean Accident & 'G. 1C,o. v. Industrial Accident
·C'ommission, 173 Cal. 313, 159· P. 1041, L. R. A.
1917 B, 33r6.
1

In the light of 'the foregoing we conclude
that respondent a.t the time of the- injury was not
rendering any service to his master and did not
sustain an injury arising out of and in the eourse
of his employment. ' '
Under analogous ·circumstan·ces the same result was
reached by the Supreme 'C·ourt of V.ermont in K neelarnd
v. Barker (Vt.), 135 Atl. 8.
The same conclusion wa.s reached by the ~C:ourt of
Appeals of Kentucky in the case ~of In,lwnd Gas Corpo7'ation v. Fraser, 55 S. W. (2d) 26. In that !case the court
discussed first the general ''going and coming'' rule
and held that because at the time of the .accident the
employee was driving his automobile for his .own purpose,
to-wit, :to transport him.self from his home to the place
where his empl,oyment would begin, and that the mere
fact that he required his automobile in his duties or that
he- had in his automobile the equipment ·of the company,
which 1he n·eeded to perform his services, was wholly
immaterial in determining whether he was then in the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
course of his empl·oyment. In that case it clearly
appeared, as it doe's in this ease, that the ·employee was
using·· his ovvn means of conveyance as a convenience in
transporting him~self from his home to his work and
suffered an injury \Yhile he was so engaged. In the ease
last referred to, there \Ya.s more reason than in the case
at bar for holding that the employee was at the time
in the course of his employment, because Vhe employee
in that ease vvas required to use his own automobile in
which he transported equipment belonging to the c'ompany needed in his work. Such was also the .situation
in Chernick's case, 189 Northeastern 800 (Mass. 1934),
wherein the Court said at page 801:
''It is now elementary that the ·Compensation Act (G. L. ( Ter. Ed.) c. 152) does not extend
to cover employees going to and coming :from
their work, or when, as here, they do not have
work assigned to be performed elsewhere until
instructed at the ·nffice. McNicol's c·ase, 215
Mass. 497, 498, 102 N. E. 697, L! R. A. 1916A 306;
Rourke's Case, 237 Mass. 360, 129 N. E. 603, 13
A. L. R. 546."
As we have heretofore said, the employee in the
case at bar, at the time of the accident, was not engaged
lin or ruhout the furtherance of the business or affairs
of his employer nor wa.s he under the control of th~
employer. The employer had not assumed any obligation for the transportation of its employees. It had no
concern whatever in the transportation or the means
of transportation of employees to and from their place
of work. The accident to the applicant did not result
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from a risk or hazard, which w·as necessarily or ordinarily or reasonably inherent or incident to his work.
All the authorities have repeatedly held that a distinct
pre-requisite to the right of compensation is that the
employee. rruist :have been· performing' a service' 'to his
employer at the time of the injury, and that the employer
had the right to contr·ol and direct him.
In this case, it is obvious that the injury to the
applicant, Harris, did not take place in the course of his
employment; nor was he at the time of the accident
performing any service incidental to ·or growing out o.f
his employment; nor \v.as he acting in the course thereof.
The applicant chose his own means of ·conveyance
for the purpose of going to obtain his supper. There
was no agreement on the part of the employer to transport any employee to or from work.

At the time of

the accident he was performing no duty incidental to his
employment.

The matter of where he should eat his

lunch was his ·own individual affair. He chose to eat it
at his home and selected his .own means of transportation.

The applicant incurred a. danger of ·his own

choosing and one altogether ·outside of his employment.
The act ·Qf ,_~he applicant i:rl going to his own home and
choosing his own means· of conveyance was entirely
personal. He selected his oWn. time and place to eat and
during the time that he selected, his employer asserted
no authority oyer him. and derived no benefits from his
acts.
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Conclusively sustaining plaintiff's P·oint One, that
an employee injured on the way to and from meals is
not entitled to ·C.Onlpensation, beeause ilie is serving
primarily a purpose -of hi~s own, are the following cases,
the facts in "\Yhich eoincide "\Yith those in the ease under
rev1ew.

Honnold on Workman'e Compensation
Acts, Sec. 107 page 358. to 361;
Boyd's Workma.n's Compensation Acts,
Sec. 481, page 1061 ;
Hills v. Blair,
182 Michigan 20, 148 N. W. 243;
Haggard's Case,
234 Mass. 330, 125 N. E. 5·61;
London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Ind.
Ace. Com., 190 Cal. 587, 213 Pac. 977;
Pearce v. Ind. Ace. Comm.,
299 Ill. 161, 132 N. E. 440;
Clark v. Voorhees,
231 N. Y. 14, 131 N. E. 553;
Jolvnson v. Smith,
'263 N. Y. 10, 188 N. E. 140;
Clapp's Parking Station v. Ind. Accident
·Com., 51 C'al. App. 624; 197 P. 369.
Scott Tobacco v·. ·Cooper,
258 Ky. 795, 81 s. W. (2d) 588;
Jack v. Morrow Mfg. Co.,
185 N. Y. Supp. 588;
Sou.thern Surety Co. v. Gallowa.y,
89' ~Okla. 45, 2.13 P. 850;
Taylor v. Binswwnger and Co.,
130 V a. 545, 107 S. E. 649;
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0 hrm.ru,nd v. I nd~ C.om~·,
.211 Wis. 153, 246 N. W. 589;
Ru.sh Canst. Co. v. Woodward,

14 P. (2d) 409.
In Ha·gg·ar·d's Q.a.se, supra, a teamster, who, with
his team, was hired by a city to do general hauling,
was injured .while eating his lunch. On the day in
question he was hauling coal from a pile near a railroad.
It did not appear that he received any orders from
·his employer except as to places of delivery or receipt
of l.oads. As his team was being fed near the coal pile
he sat down on a railroad track to eat his own lunch,
leaning against a railroa:d car. While he was sitting
there, the car against which he was leaning was moved
unexpectedly when bumped by another ear, and claimant
was injured when he rolled under the car. In holding
that the accident did not arise out of claimant's employment, the court said that he
'' eho.se 'to go to 1a dangerous place where he
had no business to go, incurring a danger of his
own choosing and one altogether outside any
reasonable exercise of his employment, and the
act in which he was engaged had no relation to
his employment.' ''
The claim was dismissed.
In C~ark v. Voorhees, supra, claimant sought compensation for the ·death of a salesman employed by a
wholesale fruit and vegetable merchant. It appeared
that he was killed by a motor truck while eros·sing the
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street from his employer's place of business to. a restaurant for the purpose of having his lunch. In reversing· an avvard of con1pensation, the court held that the
accident neither arose out of nor in the course of decedent's employment.
The Court said :
''When the decedent left the employer's place
of business for the purpose stated, and while
walking in the street he was not ·doing anything
which he was employed to do; nor wa.s it anything
incident to or connected with the employment.
It was no mo.re a part of his employment than it
would have been had he started for his own home
for the purpose of getting his breakfast. The
business of the employer ended when he got into
the street. (Armstrong, Whilworth & c·o. v. Redford, 1920 App. Cas. 737; Davidson v. M. Robb,
1918 App. Cas. 304). While on the way to the
restaurant he was engaged in his own personal
affairs.
"This ·court has recently held that when an
employee was injured while on his way to the
place where he was to render service such injuries
did not arise out of the e·mployment and were
not connected therewith. (Matter :o.f Kowalek v.
N. Y. Consolidated R. R. Co., 229 N. Y. 489;
Pierson v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 184
App·. Div. 678; affd., 227 N. Y. 666; Matter of
·Schultz v. Champion ·Welding & Mfg. Co., supra).
Also, where a. workman left the employer's premises to go. to his home for dinner. (Matter of
Mcinerney v. Buffalo & S. R. R. Corporation, 225
N.Y. 130)."
The case of Ohrmund v. Ind. Comm., supra, involved
a claim for injuries sustained by an automobile mechanic
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in an accident while returning from lunch at his home
to work overtime :on Saturday afternoon.. He was given
permission to use his employer's car to go to lunch, and
was told to hurry back. In reversing judgment which
affirmed an award of compensation, the court held that
claimant's injuries were not compensable, since at the
time of the accident he was not performing services
growing out of and incidental to his employment within
the meaning of the statute.
The court said :
'·'It is difficult to imagine what services the
employee rendered to his employer in going home
for this meal. During that period he was on his
own time, he was subject to no control while away,
he performed no act which in the slightest degree
advanced his employer's interests. In hurrying
back he was not rendering a service, he was returning t.o. a place where he was required to
present himself for the purpose ·of future service.
It was a part of his duty as an emp1oyee to present himself at the place where the service was to
be rendered. The master had not agreed to transport him and did not transport him. Therefore
the relation of employee and employer did not
exist, until he returned to the place where, by
the term of employment, he was required to per. form. service. Geldnick v. ·Burg, 202 Wis. 209,
231 N. W. ·624. This ease is ruled clearly by
Bloom v. Krueger, 182 Wis. 29~ 195 N. W. 851.
Speaking for the ·court in that case, Doerfler J.
said, 'The controlling fact in the ·case, which
stands ·out fo·remost above all others consists of
the employee's use of the truck solely for the
purpose of enabling him to obtain his noonday
meal. Assuming that the employer ·either exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pressly or impliedly consente·d to the use of hi~
truck f.or this purpose, such use was and· must
be deemed to have been solely for the employee's
benefit during a period of time while the relation~
ship of Inaster and servant was su;s-pended.''
The foregoing authorities demonstrate the fallacy
of confusing an act done by an employee f.or his own
benefit and preparatory to his work with an act done
in the course of his employment.

II.
NO EVIDENCE OF PERMANENT INJURY.

As hereinbefore stated, there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever in the record by a physician !or anyone
else to the effect that the injury to the applicant's leg
is permanent. Nevertheless, the Commission, in the
absence of any such evidence, in its finding No. II found
as a fact that the applicant "now suffers some permanent partial loss of the use of his left leg below the knee
as a result ·of the injury ·of May 8, 1939," and in its
conclusions of law concluded that the plaintiffs herein
should pay ''compensation ·Covering permanent loss of
bodily function, if any, resulting from the said injury,
the degree .of which is to be determined at the pr·oper
time.''
''A failure to sustain a burden of proof eannot be remedie-d by a finding based upon guess,
conjecture, or surmise.'' Glass on Workman's
Compensation Law, p.p. 39-40.
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"The burden rests up·on the employee to
prove the facts as to the character and extent of
the injury justifying, under the terms of the
statute, an award in the amount that he seeks,
whether it be for a total disability, permanent
or temporary, or for a permanent or temporary
partial disability.'' 71 C. J. 1070.
In view of the fact, as stated, that there is no
evidence whatsoever in the reeord with reference to
permanent injury, such finding and conclusion of law
with reference to the same are without any basis or
foundation whatsoever and the result of mere surmise,
speculation, and conjecture, and on this ground alone,
the decision of the Industrial Commission herein should
be annulled and set aside.

THE DECISION HEREIN WOUL·D RENDER THE
EMPLOYER LIABLE TO THIRD· PERS·ONS FOR
ANY INJURIES RECEIV'ED THROU~GH THE
NEGLIGENCE OF THE EMPL·OYEE.
Dis-cussion of the above point, while not strictly
pertinent to the case at bar, is vital, because an incorrect
decision of the instant case would have as one of its
far-reaching evil consequences the upsetting of a wellsettled branch of law.
If logically carried out, it would follow necessarily
that if the applicant, Harris, was in t~he .course of his
employment, when he was returning to work on the
motorcycle, and he had negligently injured a third person, instead of himself, that such third person would
be entitled to recover damages from the employer.
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The absurd results that "'"ould follo'v a decision that
an employet• is aeting in the eourse of his employment
while transporting himself to work, '~lhether it be in his
own conYeyance or his employer's conveyance, and even
though it was necessary that he use such conveyance in
performing his duties is illustrated in the case of
Carroll v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 17 P.
(2d) 49. In that case 0 'Brien was employed by the
telegraph company as a motorcycle messenger, whose
duty it \Yas to deliver messages and packages as dire-cted.
On the day in question he obtaine-d permission from his
employer to get some horn brackets for the purpose of
attaching to his motorcycle, and on his return from so
doing injured the plaintiff, who sought to hold the defendant telegraph company responsible.
This was a case where a third party sought to hold
the employer liable in damages.

The facts are similar

to the case at bar. The court said at page '50:
''But it is argued that the boy in order to
hold his position and p·erform his duties, was
required to have a motorcycle in proper repair
and the master was concerned in seeing to it
that the employee was so equipped. Likewise t·o
hold his position the boy would require food,
·clothing, proper shelter and perhaps medical care,
and other things too numerous to mention. ·C·ould
it be reasonably argued that, if, after a hard day's
work the boy was on his way home to obtain
food, rest and care necessary to fit him for the
next day's w·o.rk, he would therefore then be about
the master's business and in the course of his
employment? We see no difference in principle
between the two situations.''
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To the same effect is the case of Nussbaum v. Trawng
Label and Lithograph Company, 46 Cal. App. 561, in
which the court said at page 571:
''If the rule he extended to hold the master
liable for the negligent acts of a servant while
on his way to report for duty in the morning,
the master would als-o be liable for the negligent
acts of the servant while preparing his dinnerpail before leaving his home, because he is then
preparing, or, in a sense, on his way to report
for ·duty; and, also the master under such a rule,
would be liable £or the negligent act of a servant
from the time he arose from his bed in the morning in p·reparation to report for his day's duties.
The statement of such a rule reduces it to an
absurdity.''
It has thus been the settled law of this state for
many years that in an action against an employer for
injuries negligently caused by his employee when he is
traveling from his home to his place of employment in
the vehicle which he must use in performing his duties
of employment the employer is not liable, because the
employee is not acting in the course of his employment.
That view is not peculiar to this state, as appears from
the result recently reached by the Washington court in
the . c·a.rr·oll case, · and in the many other ·Cases herein
cited.·
Inasmuch as in the two -cases last referred to, the
employee was required to op·erate a vehicle, there was a
stronger combination of facts in favor of the employee
than in the ·case at bar, but yet the court, in each of these
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cases, held that the. employee was not within the scope
of his employment during- his absence fron1 his duties~
The last expression of this court upon the subject
of liability of the employer to third parties is to be
493,t
found in the ·case of Sa~t~s v. Affleck, 102 P. (2d)
.
w·herein this eourt held that the employee, at the time
of the injury to a third person, was acting outside of
the scope of his employment and, hence, the doctrine
of respondeat superior was not applicable. The evidence
in that ~case was clear as it is in this case • that the
employee had departed from the scope ·o.f his employment. In that case, just as in this case, the vehicle
operated by the employee was owned by the employer.
However, in that case it was the .regular duty of the
employee to operate the deliver truck which, of course,
is not the situation in this case. On the contrary, it
.appears that in this ·case the employee, Harris, took the
motorcycle without permission. In the case referred
to, this court said that the p·resumption of the agency of
the driver arising from proof of ownership by the employer was overcome by .clear, convincing a~nd con·Clusive evidence that the ·truck was not at the time of
the accident being operated on the employer's business,
but was being driven by the employee ·on an errand of
his own, and, hence, as a matter ·o.f law, the employer
was not liable. Such is the situation in this case and this
court, as a 1natter of law, should decide in accordance
with the uncontradicted evidence that at the time of the
accident the defendant was not within the scope of his
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employment and that, therefore; the· decision of the
Industrial C·o-mmission herein should he annulled.

While additional cases might be -cited from Utah
and other jurisdictions, further citation of authorities
would seem unnecessary. There is no case, which we
have been able to discover, which questions the authority
of the above cases, or which departs fr·om the principles
es~ablished by those cases.
As hereinbefore pointed out, the decision in this
ease that the employee was in the course of his employment at the time he was injured is particularly vital
because it involves not only the liability of an employer
for workmen's c·ompensation for injuries not heretofore
considered or established as compensable, but also f.or
liability to third persons who have been negligently injured by his employee under similar circumstances. It
has heretofore been assumed by all concerned that the
decisions in this state have determined that the established law in this state is that there is no liability of
the employer to third pers·ons or to the employee himself
where the injury occurs before the employee ha·s reached
his place of employment when at the time he is on an
errand of his nwn and not under the -control or direction
of the employer.

Such decisions are in accord with

those of the courts of last resort of every state where the
problem has arisen.

As hereinbefore pointed out, the

decision is directly opposite and contrary to the rule
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established by this court in the case of Fidelity and
Casualty Compam.y v. Commission, 79 Utah 189, 8 P.
( 2d) 617. To justify the decision of the Commission in
this case, it would follow that the law established in
that case must be overrule,d and that this court must
depart from similar de-cisions of the courts of last resort
of every other state.
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully urge that
the a-vvard of the Industrial Commission herein be
annulled and set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
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L.

DAY,
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
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